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SANDERS V. WEINBERGER: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
DECISIONS NOT TO REOPEN ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT
Pursuant to authority granted under the Social Security Act, the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare has established nu-
merous procedural safeguards designed to prevent the unjust denial
of social security benefits to qualified applicants.' Before exercising
his statutory right to appeal to the courts,' an applicant may obtain
administrative review of an adverse determination at least three
times.' Even then, his administrative remedies are not necessarily
foreclosed, for years after the decision has been made "otherwise
final," certain circumstances may warrant a reopening of the origi-
nal claim.' The extent to which the Secretary's refusal to permit
1. 42 U.S.C. § 405(a) (1970) reads in pertinent part:
"The Secretary shall have full power and authority to make rules and regulations and to
establish procedures, not inconsistent with the provisions of this subchapter, which are neces-
sary or appropriate to carry out such provisions.
2. See note 6 infra.
3. After receiving an application for benefits, the agency makes an initial determination
based upon the claimant's statement and upon investigations performed by agency casework-
ers. This initial determination is final unless the claimant applies for reconsideration within
six months from the mailing of notice of an adverse decision. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.908, 404.911
(1976). After reconsideration, essentially a repeat of the first stage except that new evidence
also is considered, the claimant has another six months to request a hearing. 20 C.F.R. §
404.918 (1976). Upon a showing of good cause, the period may be extended. 20 C.F.R.
404.954(a) (1976). If the claimant again suffers an adverse decision, he may seek review by
the Appeals Council. 20 C.F.R. § 404.945 (1976). A failure to request review renders the
examiner's decision final. 20 C.F.R. § 404.940 (1976). If review is granted by the Council,
however, the claimant can appear before its chambers in Washington, D.C. Upon a rejection
of review or affirmation of an adverse determination after review, the action becomes final
and the claimant may seek judicial review under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1970)
[note 6 infra]. For a discussion of this procedure see Comment, The Social Security Appeals
Process: A Critical Analysis of Administrative and Judicial Reviews, 3 CuM.-SAM.L. RENv. 279
(1972).
4. 20 C.F.R. § 404.957 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
An initial, revised, or reconsidered determination of the Administration or a
decision or revised decision of a hearing examiner or of the Appeals Council
which is otherwise final . . . may be reopened:
(a) Within 12 months from the date of the notice of the initial determination
. . . to the party to such determination, or
(b) After such 12-month period, but within 4 years after the date of the
notice of the initial determination . . . to the party to such determination, upon
a finding of good cause for reopening such determination or decision, or
(c) At any time when:
(8) Such initial, revised, or reconsidered determination or decision or revised
decision is unfavorable, in whole or in part, to the party thereto but only for the
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:181
such a reopening is reviewable in federal court, however, has been
the subject of much debate.'
Although the Social Security Act expressly entitles an applicant
to judicial review of a final decision made after a hearing, it is silent
as to decisions not to reopen.' Section 405(h) of the Act, however,
declares post-hearing "findings and decisions" to be "binding" and
proscribes review of such determinations "except as herein pro-
vided." 7 Nevertheless, in Sanders v. Weinberger' the Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit recently held that a federal court has
independent jurisdiction under section 10 of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA)9 to review reopening decisions for possible
abuse of discretion. According to the court, the Social Security Act's
section 405(h) preclusion of review applies to final decisions made
after mandatory hearings, but not to reopening decisions. Thus re-
view is available under the APA, which authorizes limited review
of agency action unless "(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2)
agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.""'
Although the court's interpretation of section 405(h) is consistent
with the trend of authority," the issue of reviewability of Social
Security Agency decisions not to reopen a prior determination re-
mains unresolved; the circuit courts are not in accord 2 and, until
purpose of correcting clerical error or error on the face of the evidence on which
such determination or decision was based.
5. Compare Stuckey v. Weinberger, 488 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1973) with Cappadora v. Cele-
brezze, 356 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1966).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1970) provides in pertinent part:
Any individual, after any final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing
to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain
a review of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days after
the mailing to him of notice of such decision or within such further time as the
Secretary may allow ...
7. 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (1970) provides in pertinent part:
The findings and decisions of the Secretary after a hearing shall be binding
upon all individuals who were parties to such hearing. No findings of fact or
decision of the Secretary shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal, or
governmental agency except as herein provided ...
8. 522 F.2d 1167 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3685 (U.S. Jan. 1, 1976) (No.
75-1443).
9, 5 U.S.C. §§ 704-706 (1970).
10. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1970).
11. See cases cited note 12 infra.
12. Of the six other circuits that directly have confronted the issue, four have held specifi-
cally that a refusal to reopen is reviewable under the APA. Ruiz-Olan v. Secretary of HEW,
511 F.2d 1056 (1st Cir. 1975); Maddox v. Richardson, 464 F.2d 617 (6th Cir. 1972); Davis v.
Richardson, 460 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1972); Cappadora v. Celebrezze, 356 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1966).
The Ninth Circuit has declined to review reopening decisions when prior factual determina-
1976] SOCIAL SECURITY ACT
Sanders, the Supreme Court refused to consider the matter. 3 This
Comment will focus on the validity of the Sanders rationale. 4
PRE-SANDERS CASE LAW
The court in Sanders relied heavily on the Second Circuit decision
Cappadora v. Celebrezze, 5 the first in a series of circuit court cases
directly confronting the issue of whether section 405(h) of the Social
Security Act" forecloses judicial review of reopening decisions under
the APA. In Cappadora a widow's claim for insurance benefits ini-
tially was disallowed for lack of proof. 7 Following her death some
eight years later, her administratrix sought to have the decision set
aside and the application reconsidered. When an agency hearing
concerning whether reconsideration should be awarded resulted in
the denial of her request, the administratrix sought judicial review.
Considering first the jurisdictional question, the court conceded
that nothing in the Social Security Act authorizes courts to review
refusals to reopen. Section 405(g), the provision allowing a claimant
to seek review within sixty days of a post-hearing final determina-
tion," applies to final decisions." The court, however, rejected the
tions have been made final by res judicata. Stuckey v. Weinberger, 488 F.2d 904 (9th Cir.
1973). And the Fifth Circuit, though appearing to follow the majority, has left the question
open whether res judicata forecloses review when the claimant is given a full evidentiary
hearing. Ortego v. Weinberger, 516 F.2d 1005, 1009 n.3 (5th Cir. 1975). The Tenth Circuit
has not considered the impact of the APA, but has refused to review dismissals of second
applications. See Neighbors v. Secretary of HEW, 511 F.2d 80 (10th Cir. 1974).
13. Before granting certiorari, the Court twice had refused to do so. Bailey v. Weinberger,
419 U.S. 953 (1974); Wallace v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 913 (1974), denying cert. to, 488 F.2d
606 (9th Cir. 1973). In Bailey three justices, noting the division among the circuits, dissented.
14. The court in Sanders also decided that section 10 of the APA amounts to an indepen-
dent grant of subject matter jurisdiction. 522 F.2d at 1169-70. For a discussion of this issue
see Ortego v. Weinberger, 516 F.2d 1005, 1009-15 (5th Cir. 1975).
15. 356 F.2d I (2d Cir. 1966).
16. See note 7 supra.
17. As the claimant made no written request for a hearing or for reconsideration within six
months of the initial determination, the initial determination became final, pursuant to 20
C.F.R. § 404.908 (1976).
18. For the relevant provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1970) see note 6 supra.
19. Although the court recognized that section 405(g), if taken literally would apply to any
decision that happened to follow a hearing, it rejected such a reading as "unnatural and
unsound, and scarcely consistent with the wise counsel to reject 'the tyranny of literalness'
and remember that 'a restrictive meaning for what appear to be plain words may be indicated
by the Act as a whole.' " 356 F.2d at 4, quoting United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194,
199 (1957). It would be more reasonable, according to the court, to limit section 405(g) review
to final decisions based on hearings made mandatory by 42 U.S.C. § 405(b), which entitles
an applicant to a hearing only when one is timely requested after an adverse initial determi-
nation on the merits. To apply section 405(g) review to reopening decisions based on discre-
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contention that section 405(h)'s preclusion of review "except as
herein provided"' " operates to bar review under the APA. 21 A cor-
rect interpretation of the reviewability provisions of the Social Se-
curity Act requires a conjunctive reading; sections 405(g) and 405
(h) should be construed as applying to the same kinds of decisions.
Viewed in this light, section 405(h) is merely a procedural mandate
foreclosing review of final decisions on the merits by any avenue but
that prescribed by section 405(g). The court concluded therefore
that a refusal to reopen is subject to neither section 405(g) review,
nor section 405(h) finality. 2
Having overcome the first statutory obstacle to APA reviewabil-
ity, the court proceeded to dismiss the second,'2  deciding that
though the Secretary's discretion in deciding whether to reopen an
tionary hearings "might deter the agency from giving a procedural benefit" not required by
law. 356 F.2d at 4-5.
20. For pertinent text of section 405(h) see note 7 supra.
21. Pertinent provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act read:
Application; definitions.
(a) This chapter applies, according to the provisions thereof, except to the
extent that-
(1) Statutes preclude judicial review; or
(2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.
5 U.S.C. § 701 (1970).
Right of review. A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a rele-
vant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
Actions Reviewable. Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency
action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to
judicial review. . . . 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1970).
Scope of review. To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitu-
tional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of
the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court shall-
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably de-
layed; and
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclu-
sions found to be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or im-
munity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limita-
tions, or short of statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law . . . . 5
U.S.C. § 706 (1970).
22. 356 F.2d at 5 (emphasis supplied).
23. See note 10 supra & accompanying text.
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otherwise final determination is extensive, it is not so absolute as
to be immunized from review for abuse.24 In addition to being proce-
durally feasible" such a limited scope of review accords with the
Social Security Act's scheme.2" Moreover, it is doubtful that Con-
gress intended to deny a claimant access to the courts "because of
an unreasonable or inappropriate agency rule on reopening or be-
cause of a truly arbitrary administrative decision."27
The reasoning of the court in Cappadora in applying the APA
provisions on reviewability to social security reopening decisions has
persuaded several other appellate courts to hold similarly. In
Maddox v. Richardson,2" decided six years after Cappadora, the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered a refusal to
reopen a decision that, as in Cappadora, had become final because
of failure to request timely administrative review.29 The Secretary
contended that just as a refusal to reopen is not a "final decision"
within the review provisions of the Social Security Act, it should not
be considered under the APA a final agency action for which no
other remedy is available in a court."0 Unimpressed with the Secre-
tary's arguments and quoting heavily from Cappadora, the court
concluded that a decision not to reopen appeared to be "squarely
within the meaning" of the APA provision."
24. 356 F.2d at 5-6.
25. The court noted that most appeals would entail nothing more than "a motion for
summary judgment based on the administrative record." Id. at 6.
26. Quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405(a), the court noted that rules and procedures established by
the Secretary, in addition to being "not inconsistent" with the Act, must be "necessary and
appropriate" for carrying out its provisions. 356 F.2d at 6. Inherent in these restrictions are
guidelines for judging the limits of agency discretion once the regulations are promulgated.
356 F.2d at 6.
27. 356 F.2d at 6. In an oft-quoted statement the court also maintained that "[aibsent
any evidence to the contrary, Congress may . ..be presumed to have intended that the
courts should fulfill their traditional role of defining and maintaining the proper bounds of
administrative discretion and safeguarding the rights of the individual."
28. 464 F.2d 617 (6th Cir. 1972).
29. See note 17 supra. In Maddox, however, the request for reopening was made within the
four-year time period permitting reopening for good cause [see note 4 supra & accompanying
texti and was accompanied by additional medical information allegedly constituting new
and material evidence within the meaning of 20 C.F.R. § 404.958 (1976), which provides that
new and material evidence furnished after notice to the party to the initial determination
constitutes good cause. 464 F.2d at 618.
30. 464 F.2d at 621. Administrative Procedure Act § 10(c), 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1970) permits
review only of "[algency action made reviewable by statute and final action for which there
is no adequate remedy in a court .. "
31. 464 F.2d at 621. The court noted that although the Social Security Act provides for
review of final decisions on the merits, the APA permits only limited review. The Secretary's
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Prior to Sanders v. Weinberger" two other circuit courts reached
similar conclusions. In Davis v. Richardson,33 decided the same year
as Maddox, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that an
APA review for abuse of discretion is consistent with the Social
Security Act scheme, which limits the Secretary to making rules
that are "necessary and appropriate" to the Act's purposes. 4 Three
years later the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Ruiz-Olan
v. Secretary of HEW,35 stated perfunctorily in a per curiam opinion
citing Maddox and Cappadora:
[Tihis administrative action is subject to judicial review under
the Administrative Procedure Act, notwithstanding [sections]
405(g) and (h) of the Social Security Act. . . . But review is
restricted to ascertaining whether the administrative action was
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with the law. ...
That court's summary treatment of the jurisdictional question,
however, masked the division between the circuits. Two years prior
to Ruiz-Olan, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Stuckey
v. Weinberger7 had rejected a substantial portion of the Cappadora
rationale. 8 Basing his claim for jurisdiction on the APA, Stuckey
sought judicial review of a partial denial of his request for the re-
opening of six final, adverse decisions. 9 The district court, however,
dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction and the appellate court
affirmed.4" Although the court basically agreed with certain princi-
refusal to reopen is final in that no further administrative steps remain to be taken; if the
APA does not apply, no judicial review is available. Id.
32. 522 F.2d 1167 (7th Cir. 1975).
33. 460 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1972).
34. Id. at 775. The court was referring to 42 U.S.C. § 405(a) (1970), which is set out in part
at note 1 supra.
35. 511 F.2d 1056 (1st Cir. 1975).
36. Id. at 1058 (citations omitted).
37. 488 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1973).
38. See notes 18-22 supra & accompanying text.
39. Stuckey had filed seven applications for disability payments within an eleven year
period. The seventh sought reconsideration in light of a 1965 amendment enlarging the class
of compensable disabilities. All of the applications presented essentially the same facts, but
with several of them, Stuckey had exhausted his rights to administrative and judicial review.
On his final application he was found disabled, under the 1965 amendment, and after a
hearing he was awarded retroactive payments dating from 1963. The Appeals Council, how-
ever, refused to reopen all of his prior applications despite Stuckey's claim that there was
error on the face of the evidence. 488 F.2d at 906-908, 911.
40. Id. at 908, 912. But the circuit court, sitting en banc, was divided eight to five over the
correct reasons for affirming. See note 48 infra.
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ples articulated in Cappadora,4' it found convincing evidence in
section 405(h) of the Social Security Act" that Congress intended
"to commit irrevocably to agency discretion those decisions which
are rendered after full and fair agency hearings and to which, ac-
cordingly, the application of the traditional concept of res judicata
could not be fairly seen as unreasonable."'" Because Stuckey's re-
quest for reopening involved prior factual determinations made
final by res judicata, even limited review of the denial was fore-
closed."
The court was unwilling to follow Cappadora for several reasons.
It relied foremost on the "broad" and "unambiguous" language of
the first sentence of section 405(h) of the Social Security Act, as
embodying a policy of strict administrative finality within the con-
fines of the res judicata doctrine." According to the court, Congress
recognized the need for administrative efficiency and fiscal stabil-
ity, and thus intended to give social security applicants only one
chance to take advantage of the comprehensive review procedures
afforded by the statutory system." That an applicant even had the
opportunity to seek a reopening of a final decision was deemed to
be "entirely a matter of administrative grace."" Consequently, the
41. Id. at 909. The court quoted the statements quoted at note 27 supra & accompanying
text.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (1970).
43. 488 F.2d at 910.
44. Stuckey had claimed that there was error on the face of the evidence and that the prior
determination was not founded on sufficient evidence. Id. at 911-12. Such factual claims,
according to the court, were made binding by res judicata. See note 48 infra.
45. 488 F.2d at 910. The first sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (1970) provides that the
findings and decisions of the Secretary after a hearing shall be binding upon all parties to
such hearing. The court read this provision as rendering all findings and decisions on the
merits final and subject to res judicata when judicial review either had been obtained or
precluded because not timely sought, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1970) (see note 6 supra).
488 F.2d at 909 n. 11. Interestingly, in deciding that review of reopening decisions was not
available because of this finality, the court did not focus on the second sentence of section
405(h), which bars review of "findings of facts or decisions of the Secretary . . . except as
herein provided." 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (1970). That this sentence was not deemed a general
prohibition of review activating the first exception to APA reviewability (see note 10 supra &
accompanying text) was made clear by the court's recognition that some reopening decisions
are reviewable. See note 49 infra. In a subsequent opinion, the court expressly adopted the
majority interpretation of the second sentence as applying only to decisions on the merits.
Rothman v. Hospital Service, 510 F.2d 956, 958-60 (9th Cir. 1975).
46. 488 F.2d at 911. The court also noted that section 405(h)'s bar against review would
be meaningless unless applied to the courts in that each judicial proceeding necessarily would
involve the agency and ultimately the court in a reexamination and reevaluation of evidence
previously adduced. Id. at 910.
47. Id. at 911. The court reasoned that as the regulations permitting reopening of prior
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court held that reopening petitions based on allegedly erroneous
factual determinations are committed to agency discretion and
thus, not reviewable under the APA. 5
The critical distinction, therefore, between the Ninth Circuit's
approach in Stuckey and the Second Circuit's approach in
Cappadora lies in the significance attributable to section 405(h) of
the Social Security Act. Whether the section's second sentence ex-
pressly precludes review of reopening decisions was not in dispute;
both courts treated it as applying only to decisions on the merits.49
They differed, however, as to the congressional intent underlying
the statute. The court in Cappadora found no evidence warranting
the conclusion that reopening decisions were intended to be com-
mitted to the Secretary's discretion and thus justified assuming
review jurisdiction under the APA, 0 whereas the court in Stuckey
concluded that the Secretary's discretion over such matters is abso-
lute and decided that because Congress had not specifically granted
such jurisdiction, "the courts should exercise a discreet restraint
• . .in assuming it."'" Faced with these conflicting decisions, the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in Sanders v. Wein-
berger,52 considered the reviewability of Social Security reopening
decision.
SANDERS V. WEINBERGER
In 1964 a Mr. Sanders, claiming to be mentally impaired, applied
for Social Security disability payments. The denial of the applica-
tion both initially and upon reconsideration was affirmed at a hear-
ing requested by Sanders. Failing to exercise his right to judicial
review, the claimant did not pursue the matter further until seven
factual determinations were reasonable exceptions to "strict res judicata principles," within
the Secretary's power to establish, the Secretary had absolute discretion in their application.
Id. at 910.
48. Id. at 911. Res judicata, according to the court, would bar any review of reopening
requests alleging error on the face of the record or proffering new and material evidence. Id.
n. 15. Referring to 20 C.F.R. § 404.957 (see note 4 supra), the court recognized, however, that
reopening also is permitted on non-factual grounds, such as for clerical errors on the face of
the record. In these instances, refusals to reopen are not subject to res judicata and hence,'
are reviewable for abuse of discretion. 488 F.2d at 911. Judge Merrill, however, in an opinion
concurred in by four other judges, rejected the majority's rationale. Although he agreed that,
in the instant case, it was within the Secretary's discretion to deny the reopening on the
grounds of res judicata, he felt that the court had jurisdiction under the APA to review the
decision for abuse of discretion. 488 F.2d at 912.
49. See notes 22 & 45 supra & accompanying text.
50. See notes 26-27 supra & accompanying text.
51. 488 F.2d at 911.
52. 522 F.2d 1167 (7th Cir. 1975).
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years later when he submitted a second application based on the
same facts as the original claim and offering no new evidence. The
Social Security Administration denied the second application on res
judicata grounds and refused to reopen the first because no error on
the face of the record had been shown."3 Sanders' attempt to have
the refusal reviewed in federal district court was dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction,"4 and thus on appeal, the circuit court's sole concern
was the reviewability of reopening decisions.
The court confronted a factual situation inviting the application
of res judicata principles. Because the claimant had requested re-
opening more than four years after the initial determination, the
Secretary's statutory discretion was at its broadest; he needed to
consider only error on the face of the record.5" Similarly in Stuckey
v. Weinberger, not only had the claimant been offered a full eviden-
tiary hearing before the denial of his initial application, but also his
request for reopening offered no new evidence." The court, however,
in disregarding' the Stuckey res judicata analysis, did not consider
the particular circumstances surrounding the request; rather it fo-
cused on the broader issue of whether section 405(h) of the Social
Security Act expressly bars review under the APA. The pivotal fac-
tor was neither the procedural steps taken nor the time that had
elapsed, but rather the court's authority to review the decision not
to reopen.
Writing for the majority of the court, Judge Tuttle found little
merit in the Secretary's contention that section 405(h) precludes all
judicial review not expressly authorized elsewhere in the Social Se-
curity Act. Although the court agreed that the Act gives no grant of
jurisdiction to review reopening decisions, it adopted the Cappadora
analysis of section 405(h) that rather than barring review altogether,
the section merely prohibits attempts to review final decisions on
the merits except as provided in section 405(g) .1 The court also
accepted the Cappadora position that reopening decisions is not
committed to agency discretion. In finally deciding that a refusal to
53. According to the Secretary, Sanders' original claim only could be reopened on this basis
because more than four years had lapsed since the initial adverse determination. 522 F.2d at
1169. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.957(c)(8) (1976) quoted at note 4 supra.
54. 522 F.2d at 1168.
55. "Error on the face of the evidence" is limited to error within the four comers of the
record that has caused a patently incorrect decision. Shelton v. Secretary of HEW, 428 F.2d
81 (3d Cir. 1970).
56. See notes 17 & 53 supra & accompanying text.
57. 522 F.2d at 1171.
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reopen constitutes a "final agency action" reviewable under the
APA, however, the court did more than merely reiterate the Second
Circuit's holding. Integral to the court's endorsement of Cappadora
was a recognition of the virtual presumption of judicial review that
has emerged in several recent Supreme Court decisions construing
the review provisions of the APA.55 Quoting from Abbott Laborato-
ries v. Gardner," Judge Tuttle stated that administrative action
generally is found to be reviewable unless "'clear and convincing
evidence of a contrary legislative intent'" can be demonstrated."
Because the Social Security Act contains no such evidence applica-
ble to reopening decisions, the court determined that the presump-
tion of review makes the Cappadora analysis even more convinc-
ing.6'
Although Sanders, because of its failure to confront directly the
position adopted in Stuckey v. Weinberger," does not clarify com-
pletely the issue of reviewability of reopening decisions, the decision
is significant. Not only does it strengthen Cappadora and its pro-
geny,"3 but also it encourages an uncompromising application of the
review provisions of the APA to important individual concerns at a
time when the overburdened judiciary is increasingly aware of the
need for lighter court dockets. Notwithstanding Judge Bauer's dis-
sent, 4 a closer examination of the APA's presumption of review
indicates that Sanders was decided correctly.
58. Id. at 1170.
59. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
60. 522 F.2d at 1170, quoting 387 U.S. at 141. In support of this view the court also cited
Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166 (1970) and Data Processing Service Org'ns v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150, 157 (1970). 522 F.2d at 1170.
61. Id. The court denied that the Supreme Court's recent interpretation of section 405(h)
in Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975), should affect the reviewability of reopening
decisions. In Salfi, the claimants, asserting that a certain statutory restriction on eligibility
was unconstitutional, sought review of a denial of benefits under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970). The
Court held, however, that the third sentence of section 405(h), barring all actions against the
Secretary brought under sections 1331 et. seq. to recover on any claim arising under the Social
Security Act, foreclosed federal question jurisdiction of the suit. But the Court never consid-
ered the review provisions of the APA and eventually held jurisdiction existed 11 under 42
U.S.C. § 405(g) (1970). The court in Sanders thus deemed Salfi inapplicable to whether
reopening decisions are reviewable under the APA. 522 F.2d at 1171. Accord, Lejeune v.
Mathews, 526 F.2d 950, 953 (5th Cir. 1976); Ortego v. Weinberger, 516 F.2d 1005, 1011 n.4
(5th Cir. 1975).
62. 488 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1973).
63. See note 12 supra.
64. Judge Bauer concluded that the simple language of section 405(h) forbids judicial
review of the decision not to reopen the determination. 522 F.2d at 1171.
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SECOND SENTENCE OF SECTION 405(H): NOT AN ABSOLUTE PRECLUSION
OF REVIEW
Historically, administrative bodies were seldom subject to judi-
cial overview. In their capacity as policymakers, they were identi-
fied with the legislative and executive branches. The doctrine of
separation of powers dictated judicial deference to their determina-
tions unless clear legal questions were at issue."5 As noted in
Sanders, recent Supreme Court interpretations of the APA have
evinced a trend toward abandoning such judicial restraint." In
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner7 the Court recognized that the
broad language of the APA reviewability provisions must be
treated liberally: judicial review of a final agency action by an ag-
grieved person will not be precluded unless there is a convincing
reason to believe that such was Congress' intent.6 In Barlow v.
Collins,7' decided three years later, the Court concluded that judi-
cial review of administrative action was the rule, and nonreviewa-
bility an exception that must be established."
The legislative history of the APA suggests a similar conclusion.
Labeled an "Act to improve the administration of justice by pre-
scribing fair administrative procedure,"7 it essentially codifies the
presumption of review." Under its provisions, review is available to
any "person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning
of a relevant statute. . . ,, 1 Noting the Act's purpose of conferring
full procedural protection to the individual, both the Senate and
House Committee Reports stated that statutory proscription of ju-
dicial review would be rare, for to do otherwise would afford the
65. See, e.g., Eberlein v. United States, 257 U.S. 82 (1921); Keim v. United States, 177
U.S. 290 (1900); Hadden v. Merritt, 115 U.S. 25 (1885).
66. See notes 58-60 supra & accompanying text.
67. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
68. See note 21 supra.
69. 387 U.S. at 140.
70. 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
71. Id. at 166. Other significant Court decisions recognizing the presumption of review
include Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Mulloy v.
United States, 398 U.S. 410 (1970); Association of Data Processing Service Org'ns v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150 (1970); and Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367 (1962).
72. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, U.S. Code Congressional Service, 79th Cong. 2d Sess.
228 (1946).
73. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967). See L. JAFE, JUDICIAL CON-
TROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 372 (abr. student ed. 1965).
74. Administrative Procedure Act § 10(a), 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
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administrative bodies unfettered discretion."5 Thus, although con-
firming that the APA would not contravene an explicit statutory
preclusion of review, the legislative history indicates that the intent
to forbid review must be expressed in "clear and convincing"
terms,"5 especially if money claims are involved."
In view of the foregoing, section 405(h) of the Social Security Act
apparently should not be applied to bar judicial review of reopening
decisions. Although the second sentence of the section seems to
preclude absolutely any review not expressly provided for in the
Act," a literal interpretation of statutory language taken out of
context does not constitute persuasive evidence of congressional in-
tent." The broadly remedial provisions of the APA require that a
statute be viewed in its entirety before being deemed an absolute
preclusion of review.'" Read in conjunction with the other provisions
of section 405, section 405(h) most reasonably applies only to deci-
sions on the merits.
Section 405(b) of the Act"' outlines the process by which the Sec-
retary is directed to make decisions on the merits of an application
for benefits. Under its terms the applicant is entitled to notice and
an opportunity to be heard.2 Section 405(g) dictates the procedures
75. APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 212, 275 (1946). See
Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 232 (1953).
76. According to the House Report, "ftlo preclude judicial review under this bill a statute,
if not specific in withholding such review, must upon its face give clear and convincing
evidence of an intent to withhold it. The mere failure to provide specially by statute for
judicial review is certainly no evidence of intent to withhold review." H.R. REP. No. 1980,
79th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1946).
77. The Senate Committee specifically noted that if Congress desired to place pension or
benefit cases beyond court review, it did so by express statute.
78. The second sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (1970) provides: "No findings of fact or
decision of the Secretary shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental agency
except as herein provided."
79. See Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 232-33 (1953); Note, Reviewability: Statutory
Limitations on the Availability of Judicial Review, 1973 DUKE L.J. 253, 270 [hereinafter cited
as Statutory Limitationsl.
80. Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 232-33 (1953).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 405(b) (1970).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 405(b) (1970) provides:
The Secretary is directed to make findings of fact, and decisions as to the
rights of any individual applying for a payment under this subchapter. Upon
request by any such individual. . . he shall give such applicant. . . reasonable
notice and opportunity for a hearing with respect to such decision, and, if a
hearing is held, shall, on the basis of evidence adduced at the hearing, affirm,
modify, or reverse his findings of fact and such decision. Any such request with
respect to such a decision must be filed within such period after such decision
as may be prescribed in regulations of the Secretary, except that the period so
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by which the applicant may obtain judicial review of an adverse
decision after a hearing. 3 There is no dispute that the hearing that
creates the right to review in section 405(g) is the same hearing that
is provided for in section 405(h), thus both sections apply only to
decisions on the merits. 4 Consequently, as the court in Cappadora
concluded, section 405(h) reasonably should apply to the same
kinds of decisions." The first sentence makes a decision after the
hearing binding and the second sentence prohibits review of that
decision unless the applicant complies with the requirements of
section 405(g). Even the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
Stuckey v. Weinberger" conceded that the second sentence of sec-
tion 405(h) does not bar review of reopening decisions, but only of
decisions on the merits if an applicant attempts to bypass section
405(g) procedures. 7
The Supreme Court's recent consideration of section 405(h) in
Weinberger v. Safi5 lends further support to such an interpreta-
tion. In Salfi, the claimants based their suit for review of a denial
of benefits on federal question jurisdiction. Although the Court
eventually found jurisdiction to review the denial under section
405(g) of the Act,'" it first held that the third sentence of section
405(h) absolutely foreclosed any action for benefits founded on fed-
eral question jurisdiction." Rejecting the contentions that the
prescribed may not be less than six months after notice of such decision is
mailed to the individual making such request. The Secretary is further author-
ized, on his own motion, to hold such hearings and to conduct such investiga-
tions and other proceedings as he may deem necessary or proper for the adminis-
tration of this subchapter.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1970). For pertinent provisions, see note 6 supra.
84. See, e.g., Stuckey v. Weinberger, 488 F.2d 904, 909 n. 11 (9th Cir. 1973); note 19 supra.
85. See notes 18-22 supra & accompanying text.
86. 488 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1973).
87. See note 45 supra. Section 405(h) has been interpreted similarly with regard to medi-
care claims. See, e.g., Rothman v. Hospital Serv., 510 F.2d 956, 958-59 (9th Cir. 1975);
Kingsbrook Jewish Medical Center v. Richardson, 486 F.2d 663, 666-67 (2d Cir. 1973).
88. 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
89. The claimant brought a class action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970) alleging that he had
been denied benefits pursuant to an unconstitutitonal statutory restriction on eligibility.
90. Although the claimant had not participated in a hearing, a prerequisite to review under
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1970) (see note 6 supra), the Court held that the initial determination
had been final because the only remaining issue concerned the constitutionality of the statu-
tory restriction. Thus it was held that the claimant should be able to obtain review under
section 405(g). 422 U.S. at 766-67.
91. 422 U.S. at 761. The third sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (1970) provides: "No action
against the . . . Secretary . . . shall be brought under [sections 1331 et. seq.] of Title 28 to
recover on any claim arising under this subchapter."
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provision was intended merely to require the exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies or to prevent a bypass of section 405(g) review
procedures, the Court maintained that those functions are fulfilled
by the first two sentences of the section, which "prevent review of
decisions of the Secretary save as provided in [section] 405(g)."I2
Although Salfi is not controlling in that the Court considered
neither reopening decisions nor the review provisions of the APA,
the case does indicate that the second sentence of section 405(h)
does not stand alone as an absolute preclusion of review. By constru-
ing the sentence as a requirement for administrative exhaustion
under section 405(g), the Court implicitly accepted the Cappadora
view that the preclusion of review was intended to reach only deci-
sions on the merits of an application, that is, the same decisions that
section 405(g) reaches." Thus, it appears that the Court also would
accept the Cappadora conclusion that the sentence does not reach
reopening decisions. 4
The Social Security Act's silence as to reopening decisions and
the broad language of section 405(h) do not in themselves overcome
the presumption of review embodied in the APA. As the Supreme
Court has stated, "[m]ere failure to provide for judicial interven-
tion is not conclusive; neither is the presence of language which
appears to bar it. '9 5 The question is not whether Congress would
have precluded review of reopening decisions had it considered the
matter, but whether such review was in fact precluded." As no
indication exists that Congress even contemplated that the Secre-
tary would provide for reopening, it is highly improbable one could
uncover "clear and convincing evidence" that the legislature in-
tended to exempt refusals to reopen from review. Consequently,
unless reopening decisions are "committed to agency discretion,"
the court in Sanders v. Weinberger7 was correct in holding they are
subject to review for abuse of discretion under the APA. 5
92. 422 U.S. at 757.
93. See notes 18-22 supra & accompanying text.
94. In Sanders, the Secretary argued that Salfi implies that the second sentence should
be read as broadly as the Court read the third and thus should bar review of reopening
decisions. See note 61 supra.
95. Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 233 (1953).
96. One reason for the bill was to afford review in cases where the relevant federal statutes
do not provide for it or do not cover the particular situation involved. APA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 368 (1946).
97. 522 F.2d 1170 (7th Cir. 1975).
98. See notes 58-61 supra & accompanying text.
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REOPENING DECISIONS AND THE SECOND EXCEPTION TO APA
REVIEWABILITY
The APA expressly authorizes a court to set aside agency action
that is "arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion. .... 1
Courts and commentators have not agreed how this authority is
qualified by the provision that bars review "to the extent" that a
decision is "committed to agency discretion."'"" The mere existence
of discretion, however, clearly neither totally bars nor invariably
creates a right to review; rather, the question is the degree to which
discretion is committed.'"' Courts will examine the purpose and
legislative history of the relevant statute to determine the intended
scope of discretionary powers."' Even though an agency's discretion
is broad, it thus may be subject to limited review under the APA. 03
Moreover, if significant personal or property interests are involved,
or if justice demands redress, judicial intervention seldom is fore-
closed. 10,
In Sanders, the Seventh Circuit deemed the absence of explicit
authorization of judicial review inadequate to overcome the pre-
sumption of review of administrative actions.0 5 The court, however,
never directly confronted the Ninth Circuit's contention in Stuckey
v. Weinberger'"' that the Secretary has absolute discretion in decid-
ing whether to reopen a case. The court in Stuckey interpreted the
99. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(A)(1970).
100. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1970). See generally Mahinka, The Problem of Nonreviewability:
Judicial Control of Action Committed to Agency Discretion, 20 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1974). Note,
Reviewability of Administrative Action: The Elusive Search for a Pragmatic Standard, 1974
DUKE L.J. 382.
101. See 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 28.08 at 33-34 (1958).
102. E.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410-13 (1971)
(Secretary of Transportation's authorization of federal funds for expressway construction
reviewable under APA); Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1161-63 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Dept.
of H.E.W. does not have absolute discretion in enforcing certain provisions of Civil Rights
Act).
103. Despite the breadth of discretionary powers given to the Secretary of Transportation,
the Supreme Court in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971)
concluded that judicial review was available not only to determine whether the Secretary
acted within the scope of his authority, but also to determine whether he reasonably could
have believed that there were no "feasible alternatives" to his choice. Id. at 415-16. Comment-
ing on the APA exception for action committed to agency discretion, the Court said that is a
narrow exception applicable only in those exceptional instances where "statutes are drawn
in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply." Id. at 410, quoting S. REP.
No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945).
104. See L. JAFFE, supra note 73 at 375.
105. See notes 60 & 61 supra & accompanying text.
106. 488 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1973).
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first sentence of section 405(h) of the Social Security Act as a codifi-
cation of res judicata principles: final decisions after a hearing are
binding, rendering the opportunity to reopen such a decision subject
to administrative grace."'7 The court's holding, however, is neither
consistent with the trend of authority""' nor founded on sound rea-
soning.
First, the provision in dispute, which makes the Secretary's post-
hearing decisions "binding upon all . . . parties to such hearing,","'
is read more reasonably as a confirmation of the finality of the
Secretary's action, signifying only administrative conclusiveness."
As the Supreme Court asserted in Weinberger v. Salfi," "the first
two sentences of section 405(h) .. .assure that administrative ex-
haustion will be required.""' When the section is read in conjunc-
tion with section 405(g) providing for judicial review of "any final
decision of the Secretary made after a hearing. . ." such an inter-
pretation is compelling."3 As the clear purpose of Congress was to
render the "binding" decisions of section 405(h) subject to judicial
review under section 405(g), it is unreasonable to conclude that
section 405(h) gives the Secretary absolute discretion over any deci-
sion.
Nevertheless, even if section 405(h) could be interpreted as a
codification of res judicata, the doctrine should not be applied to
preclude judicial review of reopening decisions, in that the issue of
reopening differs from that of the prior determination. Rather than
determining if the applicant is entitled to benefits, the Secretary
must decide whether there is a sufficient, statutorily defined cause
to reconsider the application." 4 He has the discretion to apply res
judicata if the reopening request has no merit, "5 but that discretion
107. See notes 44-48 supra & accompanying text.
108. See note 12 supra.
109. 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (1970).
110. See L. JAFFE, supra note 73 at 356.
111. 422 U.S. 749 (1975). The legislative history of § 405(h) is somewhat ambiguous. Id. at
758-59 n. 6. But see Id. at 790-94 (Brennan & Marshall, J.J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 757.
113. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1970).
114. See regulations providing for reopening, note 4 supra.
115. The applicable provisions of 20 C.F.R. 404.937 (1976) provide:
The Administrative Law Judge may, on his own motion, dismiss a hearing
request, either entirely or as to any stated issue, under any of the following
circumstances:
(a) Res judicata. Where there has been a previous determination or deci-
sion by the Secretary with respect to the rights of the same party on the same
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may be abused. Moreover, reopening claims often involve alleged
new and material evidence"' that might not have been considered
in the prior determination. Many courts have recognized that such
circumstances warrant a relaxation of res judicata principles, and
thus should not foreclose limited review of Social Security deci-
sions."7 As the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated: "The
dictates of equity and fundamental fairness that allow a decision
containing error on the face of the evidence to be reopened preclude
use of the same decision as a foundation for resjudicata. "I's Follow-
ing the majority view, the court in Sanders doubted that Congress
intended to deny judicial relief to an applicant for reopening who
has been rejected "because of a truly arbitrary administrative deci-
sion."I" This view not only comports with the presumption of review
as embodied in the APA,'2° but also reflects the need to safeguard
the special purposes of the Social Security Act. The Act was
adopted to counteract the burdens imposed by modern society on
vast segments of the population, notably the aged, the unemployed,
and the disabled. 2' The public interest requires that every qualified
applicant receives the statutory benefits.' 2 Moreover, as applicants
entitled to benefits because of contributions to the program have a
significant personal interest, they merit adequate safeguards to pro-
tect that interest.' 3 Consequently, courts consistently have con-
facts pertinent to the same issue or issues which has become final either by
judicial affirmance or, without judicial consideration, upon the claimant's fail-
ure timely to request reconsideration, hearing, or review, or to commence a civil
action with respect to such determination or decision ...
116. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.957 & 404.958 (1976).
117. Courts often have refused to adhere to strict res judicata principles when reviewing
denials of second and subsequent applications for abuse of discretion, e.g., Coulter v. Wein-
berger, 527 F.2d 224 (3d Cir. 1975) (alleged error on face of evidence); Little v. Richardson,
471 F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1972) (alleged error on face of evidence); Leviner v. Richardson, 443
F.2d 1338 (4th Cir. 1971) (alleged new and material evidence); Noonan v. Richardson, 338 F.
Supp. 734 (W.D. Pa. 1972) (alleged new evidence); Mullins v. Cohen, 296 F. Supp. 260 (W.D.
Va. 1969) (good cause). But see Hobby v. Hodges, 215 F.2d 754, 759 (10th Cir. 1954) (prior
determination could not be revived by subsequent application on same issue).
118. Grose v. Cohen, 406 F.2d 823, 825 (4th Cir. 1969).
119. 522 F.2d at 1170, quoting Cappadora v. Celebrezze, 356 F.2d 1, 6 (2d Cir. 1966).
120. See notes 67-73 supra & accompanying text.
121. Sayers v. Gardner, 380 F.2d 940, 942 (6th Cir. 1967).
122. See Note, Procedural Due Process and the Termination of Social Security Disability
Benefits, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 1263, 1280 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Due Process]. See also
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970) (recognizing the governmental interests in provid-
ing public welfare).
123. See Statutory Limitations, supra note 79, at 262 n. 47. Social Security disability
benefits have been likened to benefits received under an insurance contract, thus they are
said to involve a right rather than a privilege. See Due Process, supra note 122, at 1265.
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strued the Act's remedial provisions liberally.' Careful oversight of
agency action is warranted especially when the outcome directly
affects personal interests in life and health.'25
Practical considerations also require judicial review of adminis-
trative decisions not to reopen a case. The typical claimant for
disability benefits is uneducated and unskilled.' By statutory defi-
nition, he cannot qualify for benefits unless his income and re-
sources are limited.' 7 These traits make him highly vulnerable to
administrative technicalities and intricacies, unable either to un-
derstand and negotiate the complex agency procedures,' or to hire
counsel to pursue his claim in his behalf. Nor is the agency always
a disinterested party in the proceedings. Although theoretically the
interests of the agency and the applicant should coincide, appli-
cants at times have not been informed adequately of their appellate
rights.' 9 Furthermore, as noted by one commentator, "[t]hrough
its substantive regulations, the agency has adopted the policy of
strictly construing the law against a questionable case, a posture
which does not truly reflect the Congressional intent.""" Judicial
review provides the necessary safeguard against such procedural
failure and administrative bias. Furthermore, although the courts
should defer to an administrative decision if a case presents complex
issues requiring the agency's expertise,'' they should not so treat
reopening decisions, for the reopening process is governed by regula-
tions that the judiciary is well able to construe.' :" Moreover, as
recognized by the court in Cappadora v. Celebrezze, 'll granting re-
124. See Note, Administrative Procedure and the Social Security Disability Program, 2
IND. LEGAL F. 295, 307 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Administrative Procedure].
125. See L. JAFFE, surpa note 73, at 356.
126. See Administrative Procedure, supra note 124, at 298-99.
127. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (1970).
128. Judge Friendly described the regulations as "a model of what regulations addressed
mostly to laymen-or even to lawyers-ought not to be." Cappadora v. Celebrezze, 356 F.2d
1, 3 n.1 (1966).
129. Cook & McKenna, Due Process in the Administration of the Social Security Program,
33 FED. B.J. 168, 171 (1974).
130. Administrative Procedure, supra note 124, at 302. The author also points out that "on
the highest level, there is a mingling of the functions of supervising the hearing examiners,
promulgating administrative regulations, and exercising the ultimate powers of review over
the administrative adjudication." Id. at 312.
131. Board of Governors v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441, 450 (1947) (Rutledge, J., concurring).
132. Determinations of new and material evidence and error on the face of the evidence
are not foreign to the judiciary and do not require agency expertise. Moreover the regulations
allowing reopening constitute law that can be applied.
133. 356 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1966).
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view of reopening decisions would not overburden either the agency
or the courts; in most instances, when the agency has properly ful-
filled its role, the case can be disposed of by summary judgment
upon presentation of the administrative record." 4
CONCLUSION
On its face, section 405(h) of the Social Security Act appears to
bar judicial review under the APA of administrative decisions not
to reopen an otherwise final adjudication. If the section is read in
conjunction with the Act as a whole, and in view of the presumption
of review embodied in the APA, such an interpretation is indefensi-
ble. Rather than being merely products of administrative grace, and
hence absolutely committed to agency discretion, the regulations,
which provide for reopening, are essential to the underlying purpose
of the Social Security Act, which is to afford relief to qualified
applicants."' To decide that the Act bars judicial review of reopen-
ing decisions is to defeat that purpose.
134. See note 25 supra & accompanying text.
135. The Secretary has power to establish only regulations that are "necessary or
appropriate" to the Act's purposes. 42 U.S.C. § 405(a) (1970).
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